Book review: The Battle of the Berezina, Napoleon’s Great Escape

Almost two hundred years after the crossing of the Berezina River by the remnants of Napoleon's Grande Armée, a new book written by Alexander Mikaberidze, assistant professor at history at Louisiana State University at Shreveport and author of The Battle of Borodino, comes to remind us of the battle for the bridgehead, the memory of which has begun to fade from popular memory. Elia Ehrenberg once wrote that he remembered Jean Eble simply because he passed by the street bearing that general's name most days to visit his fiancée in Paris. 
 
Besides describing the battle itself, the author tries to focus on the personalities of the protagonists, such as Admiral Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov, commander of the Third Western Army, whom the Russians hold most responsible for Napoleon's escape. On 13th September, 1812, Tsar Alexander and his advisors, unaware of Kutuzov's abandonment of Moscow, came up with a new operation called the St. Petersburg plan. In essence, it called for the army of Mikhail Kutuzov to act as the hammer against Napoleon's army while Piotr Wittgenstein's and Chichagov's armies would serve as anvils against the long lines of communication for the Allied forces (a term the author also uses for Napoleon's troops because the French were by then a minority in the Grande Armée).
 
The plan got its opportunity for success soon after Napoleon's departure from Moscow on 19th October. On 23rd October, the Allies won a victory against the Russians at Maloyaroslavets, but suffered heavy casualties. On the 25th, Napoleon held a counsel of war in which it was decided that they would withdraw to Smolensk. From that point on, the strategic withdrawal became a retreat. Chichagov succeeded in capturing Minsk on 16th November, and the Borisov bridgehead on the 21st. Marshal Nicolas-Charles Oudinot's corps managed to retake Borisov on the 23rd, but the strategically important bridge was destroyed and the Russians still controlled the key heights on the opposite bank.
 
Mikaberidze reminds us that it was Oudinot who chose Studyanka as the place where new bridges should be built and not Napoleon as many believe. Napoleon, in actual fact, ordered Oudinot to construct the bridges on Veselovo. Another important aspect revealed by the author is that the majority of the pontonniers who built the bridge were Dutch and Polish, while the Frenchmen were but a small portion. Two hundred men under Captain George Diederich Benthien started work on the first bridge (the infantry bridge), while another two hundred under Captain Busch worked on the second bridge.
 
Mikaberidze reserves special honours for General Jean Baptiste Eble. The son of an artillery sergeant, Eble was fifty-four years old when he achieved the impossible in 1812. But those who most deserve the honour are the bridge workers themselves, who sacrificed themselves so the other army could escape. Eble himself would become seriously ill and will die of exhaustion at Königsberg on 31st December.
While Claude-Perrin Victor's IX Corps repulsed all the attacks by Wittgenstein's army — in spite of the surrender of his 12th Division, which left a gap in the IX Corps' defensive line — Oudinot succeeded in defeating Chichagov on the Western bank at Stakhov-Brili. The author believes that the famous 29th Bulletin exaggerated Russian losses as usual. 
 
Who, ultimately, was responsible for Napoleon's escape? The author believes that the admiral fell victim of Kutuzov's jealousy. Wittgenstein was the “Saviour of St Petersburg”, while Kutuzov had both previous fame and diplomatic capabilities, so the two of them avoided any accusations for military mistakes. Finally the brave admiral died, ironically, in Paris, and was buried at a local cemetery in Sceaux. Illustrated with photos and engravings from the author's collections, The Battle of Berezina is sure to will satisfy all enthusiasts of Napoleonic history.