150 years ago: 1859

Author(s) : FONDATION NAPOLÉON
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January

 
Italian affairs: Victor Emmanuel gets involved
With the possibility of conflict between France and Austria becoming more and more likely, the Piedmontese king Victor Emmanuel gave a speech before his parliament on 10 January 1859 which did little to ease the tensions. 'Our country, small in territory, has grown in stature amongst the councils of Europe thanks to the greatness of ideas that it represents and the friendship it inspires…If we respect the treaties, we are nevertheless not insensitive to the cries of distress which we hear emanating from so many parts of Italy…' (quoted in Roland Conilleau, l'Entrevue de Plombières).
 
A few days later, on 13 January, the Prince Napoleon and General Niel arrived in Piedmont, where they visited arsenals, ports and fortifications in the company of Alfonso Ferrero La Marmora, the Sardinian Minister for War.
 
Sources: Roland Conilleau, L'Entrevue de Plombières, Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1991
 
Science: the role of the placenta
On 10 January 1859, the doctor Claude Bernard, considered to be one of the founders of experimental medicine, presented a paper to the Académie des Sciences describing the glycogenic role of the placenta. Up to this point, it had been believed that the placenta merely fulfilled a similar function to the lungs, allowing the foetus to breathe. Bernard later went on to demonstrate the trophic, protective and hormonal roles that the placenta plays in the pregnancy. (“Sur une nouvelle fonction du placenta”, ADS XLVIII t. XLVIII, 1859, pp77-86)

Italian affairs: international community faced with the impending war in Italy
The secret treaty of military and familial alliance signed by Napoleon III and Victor Emmanuel II on 10 December (see Bulletin n° 479) and the familial alliance of the marriage of the Prince Napoleon with Victor Emmanuel's daughter, Clothilde, had cemented Franco-Piedmontese relations. But war in Northern Italy would not involve only Austria. Napoleon III therefore also had to try to control how the other European powers would act – he could not fight in Italy with the threat of military taken to his rear. His policy was thus to attempt to ensure the neutrality of the most important players in the international community for the coming conflict. In a letter to the Prince Napoleon, dated 19 January, Napoleon III noted the success of negotiations with the Tsar, led by the naval Captain La Roncière le Noury. “La Roncière has accomplished his mission very well. We have gained all we could hope for. The Emperor on parting said to him that he gave me his word of honour to do all in his power in my favour, but that he must be left the judge as to ways and suitable time.” Russian neutrality (and control of Prussia) was thus assured (at the price of a 'benevolent attitude' towards Russian 'aspirations in Poland and the Black Sea'). British reaction was however mixed. The reaction of Queen Victoria (pushed by her 'Prussian' consort, Albert) was one of indignation at Napoleon's challenge to the world order as established after the Vienna Congress of 1815. British public opinion however was against Austrian 'tyranny'. The influential British politician, Palmerston, was later to epitomise a certain British position declaring (30 January, 1859) that “I am very Austrian north of the Alps, but very anti-Austrian south of the Alps”. The stage was set for the show down.
 
Sources:
E. Hauterive, Napoleon III, The Second Empire and its downfall, New York 1970, p. 107
J. M. Thomson, Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire, New York 1955, p. 185-189
R. Conilleau, L'entrevue de Plombières, Nancy 1991
E. Ollivier, L'Empire libéral, vol. III, Paris 1898, p. 522-37.

Italian affairs: the importance of public opinion in international conflict
On 26 January, 1859, Napoleon III wrote to his cousin, Prince Napoléon, congratulating him on the way he had handled the negotiations for his marriage. He however included in a letter important instructions on how he wanted the coming war with Austria to be viewed by public opinion in France in particular and in Europe in general: “As to the question itself I shall always repeat the same thing. We must redouble our carefulness to ensure that Europe shall think we are in the right. The indiscretions being committed are so great that I am receiving news from Rome and Austria reporting that the Duc de Modène, aware that Piedmont wishes to stir up an insurrection within his states, has come to an understanding with Austria and Tuscany to take refuge in Tuscany with his troops when the occasion arises, and to appeal to the Great Powers. The chief difficulty, therefore, is always the same, and I can define it in a few words: if Piedmont has the appearance of seeking an artificial quarrel with Austria, and if I, on m side, have the appearance of approving her conduct in my desire for war, public opinion in France and in Europe would abandon me, and I should run the risk of having the whole of Europe on my hands. If on the other hand Piedmont should seem to be a victim while she is justifying her rights, everyone, with my support, would remain neutral. What is to be done then? This: to base the question on some incontestable fact of lawful right, no matter how insignificant it be. For example, if Piedmont (after having made her preparations) has a lawful right to protest against the occupation and fortifying of Placentia [i.e., Piacenza, ed.] and presses this point to the utmost, I think, perhaps, she would be placing herself on the surest ground that is possible. In a word, it is in this sense that we must work. I fear that other methods would be found out, and that the moment people see an insurrection breaking out at Massa Carrara they will say, “Voici le complot qui se déroule” (“Here you can see the plot unfolding”).
 
Source: Ernerst Hauterive, The Second Empire and its downfall, 1970, p.111

February

 
Black sea politics
At the mid-point in the nineteenth century, the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Walachia, (two-thirds of modern-day Romania), were (and had been since 1541) under the suzerainty of the sultan of the Ottoman Empire – the last third of modern Romania, Transylvania, was controlled by Austria. The principal constraint of this suzerainty was that the Danubian principalties had to pay an annual tribute to the Sublime Porte. In all other respect they remained in control of their administration, in contradistinction to the countries on the other side of the Danube, Serbia and Bulgaria, which were under direct Ottoman control. However Russia also exercised influence in the region. She had possessed Bessarabia (a large chunk of south eastern Moldavia) since 1812. And throughout the first half of the century Russian influence (and Ottoman weakness) in the region was to increase, the treaties of Ackermann (1826) and Andrinople (1829 – in the aftermath of the Battle of Navarino) enshrining Russian/Ottoman “condominium” in the region. Austria too had an interest in the area given her possession of Transylvania and the importance for her of navigation on the Danube. However the status quo was not one which pleased the populace. The admixture of a cultured French-speaking French-educated elite, bathed in Romantic ideas of the French Revolution, the recent renaissance of nearby Greece as an independent country, and an increasingly burdensome Russian/Ottoman administration, were slowly fanning to flame the sparks of desire for unification and independence. Though these were dampened by the failure of an uprising in 1848 (Russia and Turkey intervened jointly, and forcefully, to re-establish order), the movement for change was to gather strength in the following decade.
 
The difficult march towards union and independence: stage one, the double election
During the Congress of Paris in 1856, the fate of the Danubian principalities was of crucial importance for the European powers. Napoleon III (who had become personally interested in the Romanian problem) and French diplomats skilfully managed to circumvent Russian, Turkish and Austrian opposition to plans for independence by having a decision on the “Romanian” problem put off for a later date. In the mean time, the populace was to be consulted and assemblies were to be elected. Thereupon Austria, Russia and France sent their best agents to view, evaluate and if possible manipulate the elections. In this over-heated political atmosphere documents proving electoral fraud were discovered and published in France. Napoleon III raised his voice, and in August 1857 an international scandal was on the cards. However, Napoleon III soon realised that he could not bring about the unification of the Danubian principalities on his own. A meeting was organised in mid-August 1857 between Napoleon III and Queen Victoria. Faced with a Russian-British alliance, Napoleon III was forced to abandon (secretly) his plans for unification of the two principalities. A European conference met the following year to decide the issue (22 May – 19 August, 1858), producing a fudged solution which sidelined unification. It proclaimed the birth of the “United Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia” but the two entities remained separate, with two hospodars (presidents), two assemblies, and two flags.
 
All Europe was to be surprised by what happened next. On 19 October, 1858, the Moldavian divan (assembly) was elected with a unionist majority. On 7 November, the Walachian divan found itself in the same position. Both were however required to present separate constitutions and each to elect a prince regent. But there were no laws to say that this could not be one and the same person. On 17 January, 1859, the Moldavian divan chose Colonel Alexandre Ion Cuza, small property owner and obscure Moldavian soldier. On 5 February the Walachian divan elected the same man as their prince, thus de facto unifying the two principalities. This double election surprised all except perhaps French diplomats, since the French Consul, Victor Place, had secretly worked for this conclusion.

L'année diplomatique
On 7 February, 1859, A special edition of the Moniteur appeared consisting of a single page bearing the Emperor's speech to the Legislative Session of 1859 detailing his international relations.
 
In his snapshot of French diplomacy, Napoleon III spoke of the excellent state of affairs with respect to Britain: “Regarding the alliance between France and England, I have put all my energy into consolidating it, and I have found, on the other side of the straits, a welcome reciprocity on the part of the Queen of Great Britain and her ministers.”
 
Similarly, relations with Russia were on the up, he noted: “Since concluding peace [NDLR: after the Crimean War], my dealings with the Russian emperor have taken on a more honest cordiality, because we have been in agreement on all the previous points of contention.” The Captain La Roncière le Noury's diplomatic mission [see Bulletin 472] to assure Russian non-intervention in the event of war between France and Austria was of particular importance. Napoleon III also talked of the difficult relations with Austria: “On the other hand, the cabinet in Vienna and my own have often found themselves in conflict regarding the important issues […]. Thus, for example, the reconstruction of the Danubian principalities was only completed after numerous difficulties which seriously impeded the fulfilment of their most legitimate wishes. […] In such a situation, it is not at all extraordinary that France has moved so close to Piedmont. […] For a while now, the state of affairs in Italy and its abnormal situation, in which order can only be maintained through the presence of foreign troops, have quite rightly been cause for diplomatic concern.

Here we see that Napoleon III is defending his close relations with Piedmont in view of the coming conflict in Italy – Napoleon III's denial (towards the end of the speech) that there would be a war seems to imply the opposite! But there is also support for the Danubian Principalities. This is mentioned for two reasons: firstly to show off French 'libertarian' support for fledgling nations seeking self-determination (here again we are to superimpose Piedmont) but also secondly to hammer another nail in the coffin of Franco-Austrian relations. This linking of the “Romanian” question with Franco-Austrian relations was also viewed elsewhere in Europe as significant. For example, questions regarding the Danubian Principalities were asked in the British House of Lords. (The debate can be viewed on the online version of Hansard here.)

The Prince Napoléon under-fire
The chattering classes were beginning to notice how difficult the Prince Napoléon, “Plon Plon”, Napoleon III's cousin, was becoming in public life. The publicist, Viel-Castel in his memoirs (once for the date 24 February, and then again on 28 February, 1859) recorded two such moments. On 24 February, the Senate was faced with a vote on the allocation of eight hundred thousand francs to the Prince Napoléon to cover the costs of his wedding. The General de Castelbajac proposed an amendment whereby the money be given to the emperor who should use it to pay for the Prince's marriage. This was (rightly) seen as a vote of no confidence in the Prince and the Emperor attempted to sidestep the amendment. A discussion ensued, with the general affirming that whilst he had confidence in the Emperor's policies, he had absolutely none whatsoever in those of the Prince, whom he saw as hostile to the Emperor, etc. etc. Though the amendment was quashed, it nevertheless received 30 votes. On subject of an increase in the Prince's allowance, the Princess Mathilde had a very heated conversation with the Emperor (also reported by Viel-Castel). “'Do you not know,' she said, 'that Napoléon is your biggest enemy, do you not know what they say at his house? Napoléon openly expresses his factious opinions to his trusties: 'The fact is', he says, 'I think my position is good, I am well placed, and if some misfortune should befall the Emperor, I'm sure that they won't go looking for a replacement in that ninny the Empress or the baby Prince Imperial!' The Emperor did not look surprised but simply pensive.' On 28 February, Viel-Castel noted another conversation with Mathilde on the subject of the antipathy which the Prince inspired in all those who knew him. “'Alas', replied Mathilde, 'I know that he is impossible, and even Franconnière, his ADC, cannot take any more. You cannot imagine how her treats his poor wife; and how brusquely he speaks to her. For example, yesterday, at the Tuileries, seeing how much she was enjoying dancing, he made her go home at eleven o'clock. When I tried to mention it to him, he replied: 'At my house, where I enjoy myself, I go to bed at eleven o'clock. And so I am perfectly within my rights to leave this place, where I am not enjoying myself, at the same hour.' […] He des not wish to lunch with her. […] He has forbidden her to come to see him, and if she has something to say to him, she has to write to him.'

March

 
Society: libraries in Europe
On 4 March 1859, the Moniteur Universel printed a brief summary (itself originally in the Edinburgh Review) of the main European libraries and the number of books that they held. As intriguing as the statistics themselves is the choice of libraries mentioned as well as the rapid growth of the British Museum's collection.
 
“Here [is a list of the] printed riches of the principal libraries on the European continent. The imperial library [France] has on its shelves 800,000 printed works: the British Museum, 500,000; the St Petersburg imperial public library, 520,000; the Berlin royal library, 520,000; the Munich royal library, 480,000; the Copenhagen royal library, 410,000; the Vienna imperial library, 365,000; the University of Gottingen library, 360,000; the Breslau royal library, 350,000; the Dresden royal public library, 305,000. In twenty-three years, the British Museum library has gone from seventh place to second [place].” (The Edinburgh Review, quoted in Le Moniteur, 4 March 1859)
 
The rapid growth in the British Museum's collection (now the British library) was overseen by the celebrated librarian Anthony Panizzi. Born in 1797, he became involved in the movement for Italian independence but was forced to flee the country of his birth in 1821 after his arrest on subversive charges. He arrived in England in 1823 and started off teaching Italian and Italian literature in Liverpool before being invited to take the post of Chair of Italian Literature at University College, London, thanks in no small part to his friendship with Henry Brougham, the then-Lord Chancellor of England. He was appointed Assistant Librarian at the British Museum in 1831, before becoming the Keeper of Printed Books and finally Head Librarian in 1856. He oversaw the reorganisation of the library and its catalogues, as well as the reconstruction of its public reading rooms, which was completed in 1858. He received a knighthood from Queen Victoria in 1869 for his services to the library and died in 1879.

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